

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP

WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 37

For week ending 13 September 1949

Volume II

The International Week

The Anglo-US-Canadian economic parley adjourned with a disappointing communique revealing only palliatives and failing, so far, to disclose any basic attack on the dollar problem. In Strasbourg the Council of Europe wound up its meeting after giving unexpectedly forceful voice to the need for greater European political and economic unity. India rejected the Kashmir arbitration proposal while, with Iraq's point-blank refusal to admit the Near East Economic Survey Mission, general Arab coolness to the ESM became increasingly evident. In the Security Council, the USSR applied its 31st veto to Nepal's application for UN membership.

THE FORTHCOMING GA

The forthcoming GA will be notable for the disposition of the Italian colonies, a probable full-scale debate on Palestine and possibly some disclosure as to whether the current Soviet "peace offensive" is to be accompanied by any significant change in the Soviet attitude toward international cooperation. With the dual purpose of retarding implementation of the Atlantic Pact and of making Western capital equipment available to the USSR and its Satellites, the USSR will as usual have a propaganda "leit-motif" which is expected to stress Soviet devotion to peace and promotion of East-West trade. The actual Soviet approach, however, to such practical questions as the Greek border conflict and Korea should test what, if anything, lies behind Soviet professions. In the Greek case, guerrilla reverses combined with Tito's defection from the Cominform may lend added impetus to the conciliation efforts which are certain to be brought forward.

The GA agenda includes fewer major problems than those of past years. Of greatest importance is that of the former Italian colonies where the shift in the Western powers' position from trusteeship to some formula for early Libyan independence virtually insures at least a partial solution this session. Two new questions loom before the GA, a dubious Chinese Nationalist complaint that the USSR has violated the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty

DOCUMENT NO. 37  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐  
☒ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE:  
AUTH: HSP-2  
REVIEWER: 006514

and possibly Moscow's bellicose menaces against Yugoslavia, should these give indication of going beyond a mere war of nerves. Beyond arousing world opinion, however, the GA can take no practical action. Although the Western powers will do their best to play down the Palestine case while the Economic Survey Mission is in the Middle East, the Arab states, many of them hostile to the ESM, will seek to force a full-dress political debate. No overall formula for settlement acceptable to both Jews and Arabs is likely to be forthcoming, however. Should the Hague Round Table Conference progress, the Southeast Asian nations will not press the Indonesian case. The International Court of Justice may be asked for advisory opinions on South Africa's League of Nations mandate over Southwest Africa and the alleged non-compliance of Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania with the peace treaty provisions for considering such disputes as human rights violations. On the perennial issues of atomic energy control and disarmament, the East-West deadlock will continue despite any Soviet propaganda moves.

Thus, except for the Italian colonies, unless the USSR comes forth with some unexpectedly conciliatory proposals, the coming GA will be more notable for propaganda fireworks than for any concrete result.

Agreement probable on Italian colonies. With all the major Western powers now favoring early Libyan independence, at least partial disposition of the thorny Italian colonies question is almost certain at the forthcoming GA. Even France has belatedly accepted the inevitability of independence, which is strongly favored by the powerful Arab-Asiatic bloc and most of the British Commonwealth. Italian support of this solution will bring into line the key Latin American states whose support is essential for a two-thirds majority. In fact, the differences over Libya will center about the secondary issues of the proposed Advisory Council, the timing of independence and unification of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan. Despite UK objections to any Advisory Council over Cyrenaica and French suggestions that the Council actually govern Tripolitania, the US concept of a purely advisory body will probably win out. While proposals for timing range from Italian support of independence within six months to French preference for at least a five-year delay, two to three years is probably the maximum delay acceptable to the anti-colonial Arab, Asiatic and Latin American states. Unification, however, presents a more complex problem. France, fearing repercussions in French North Africa, opposes a united Libya, particularly under the Cyrenaican Senussi regime; Italy, anxious to secure a favored position in Tripolitania, favors only the loosest ties; and the UK, though opposing Italian pretensions, is anxious not to offend the French. The Arab-Asiatic bloc, however, will insist on Libyan unification, with simultaneous independence for all three

zones. The most likely compromise will be to leave the question to the inhabitants themselves, who are by no means sold on complete unification.

Disposition of Eritrea and Somaliland will be complicated by the recent growth of the Eritrean independence movement and the strong Arab-Asiatic and local opposition to Italian trusteeship for Somaliland. The US and UK still favor cession to Ethiopia of all Eritrea but the Western province (which would be incorporated into the Sudan). Italy, however, hopeful of regaining a sphere of influence, urges independence and can count on both Latin American backing and the influence of a strong Eritrean independence bloc delegation at the UN. In the case of Somaliland the strong native opposition and the risk of violence should Italy return will sway many GA members. It is difficult to predict, therefore, what solution will emerge from the inevitable vote-trading or whether the US-UK objectives will be achieved. The Assembly will be anxious to settle the entire colonies question at this session, however, and in default of the US-favored solution, either continued interim UK administration looking toward eventual independence or the Soviet suggestion for direct UN trusteeship may provide a way out.

Proposals for dealing with the Greek case. New efforts to settle the Greek guerrilla war have been stimulated by the Soviet-Yugoslav rift, recent Greek military successes and a growing belief that the USSR may be considering a shift in emphasis from the military to the political field in its anti-Greek campaign. Numerous proposals are under consideration, including (1) a strong US-UK-French note to Albania condemning its aid to the guerrillas, (2) return of the guerrillas to Greece under an amnesty, (3) various forms of conciliation during the coming UN General Assembly session, and (4) replacement of the UN Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) by three separate border commissions. Some form of conciliation talks will almost certainly be proposed during the GA, either under the auspices of the Secretary General and leading Assembly officers or by the great powers. In line with the UNSCOB report to the GA, an attempt will be made to fix the burden of blame on Albania, while playing down Yugoslav responsibility. Should no workable agreement leading to a settlement be devised, it is certain that UN machinery in some form will be maintained in Greece.

Egypt's antagonism toward Israelis forces WHO postponement. Egypt's refusal so far to permit Israeli delegates to attend the Alexandria Regional Conference of the World Health Organization is indicative of the depth of Arab resentment against Israel and the obstacles in the way of converting the present armistices into

anything resembling a peace. Egypt not only refused visas to holders of Israeli passports but finally rejected the suggested alternative of merely honoring a WHO letter authenticating the Israelis as delegates. Efforts to iron out these difficulties have forced a postponement of the WHO conference for several weeks and may require a relocation of the meeting.

Kashmir question will probably revert to the SC. India's rejection of the UNCIP arbitration proposal will probably result in the UN Commission for India and Pakistan throwing the deadlocked question back to the Security Council. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the Commission has outlived its usefulness. Nehru takes a dim view of the Commission's competence and there are signs of difficulties within the Commission, with the focus on the Czech member as the trouble maker. The manner in which he presented the UNCIP proposal evidently hardened Nehru's attitude and even adversely affected UNCIP's usefulness so far as Nehru was concerned.

In the face of Nehru's continuing intransigence, the outlook for a way out of the present impasse is not optimistic. Nehru must be fully aware that through his refusal of the proposal he is risking a major crisis at a very critical time in the Far East. He is reportedly considering partition with growing favor as the best solution; nevertheless, he has been careful not to close the door completely on arbitration or mediation. A possible SC move, which might be considered receptively by India, is to suggest a broader consideration of the Kashmir problem by arbitration of all points of dispute, including the refugee property and water rights issues. India will now turn its attention to preparations for consideration of the intimated case by the SC and, meanwhile, Nehru will undoubtedly use his visit to the US and his stop-over in England to have personal talks on the question with high level US and UK leaders.

Long-term trend toward universality of UN membership. A rising tide of UN sentiment favors admitting all membership applicants to the UN. When the USSR vetoed the admission of Nepal, it again indicated that it was ready to make a deal taking in all candidates. The US, however, while opposing any veto on membership applications, still favors abstentions in the cases of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Outer Mongolia on the ground that none is presently qualified. This attitude has thus far prevented any of the Soviet satellites from obtaining the necessary seven Security Council votes. While no break in the membership log jam is expected while the Greek border dispute and the religious question in the satellite countries are still outstanding, there is a long-term trend toward the broadest possible membership in the UN.

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

The initial session of the Council of Europe, the first real "European" political body, is further concrete evidence of the growing European belief that Europe must unify to survive. It represents a vital step along the road already opened up by the ECE, OEEC, Western Union, and the Atlantic Pact. The convocation of an official parliamentary organization seating representatives from twelve European countries attests the vitality of this belief as well as the strength of the economic and political pressures, both internal and external, which are pushing Europe toward eventual unification.

The real impetus in the Council of Europe will come not from the Committee of Ministers but from the Consultative Assembly comprised of representative delegates from national parliaments. Although at present possessing only powers of recommendation, the Assembly is in a peculiar middle position between the private organizations for European unity, which are pressing for measures far in advance of not only the European governments but even of popular opinion, and the Committee of Ministers who will undoubtedly serve as a strong brake on Assembly action. The Assembly provides a forum which, although governmentally-sanctioned, is not limited to the expression of formal governmental views. It thus focuses public attention on new ideas and a European rather than a narrow nationalistic approach, and will gradually bring public pressure to bear on governments to adopt measures which otherwise might lie dormant due to tradition and inertia.

During its initial session the Assembly displayed a high degree of European-mindedness, a strong urge to assume a more vital role and a willingness to make concrete far-reaching proposals for intra-European action. It was unwilling to accept the subordinate role assigned to it vis-a-vis the Committee of Ministers, as illustrated by its moves to increase its agenda and by its formal recommendations to the Ministers for increasing its authority. The Assembly worked smoothly as a parliamentary machine and revealed an unexpectedly European approach in that the anticipated voting blocs along national, regional, party or economic lines did not emerge. Even in economic debates there was no consistent division between economic "planners" and "liberalizers." The only real division was over the speed with which the Council should assume the powers of a federal authority, some delegates expressing more concern for the traditional concepts of national sovereignty than others. On the whole, delegates seem to have voted according to personal conviction and at times even crossed party lines within national delegations.

In general the Assembly showed a high degree of unanimity in making concrete proposals to the Committee of Ministers. Declaring that "the aim and goal of the Council of Europe is the creation of a European political authority with limited functions

but real powers," it proposed that this subject be discussed at the 1950 session. On economic matters the Assembly record was less dynamic than indicated by the auspicious early debates, although it recommended a European economic conference to consider a common preferential trading system and the dispatch of a delegation to the US to seek lowering of US tariffs. Bolder plans to take over the functions of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) were rejected as were those which threatened British policy through currency devaluation or immediate tariff reductions.

The first test of the Assembly's recommendations will come at the next meetings of the Committee of Ministers. It seems likely that the Ministers will give way on at least some of these requests, particularly those increasing the authority of the Assembly, rather than bear the responsibility for sabotaging the Council in its infancy. Although the first real accomplishments of the Council are likely to come in such relatively minor matters as a common European passport or standardization of social security provisions, the Assembly will continue to exert pressure for more far-reaching political and economic unification. Its ultimate success in these efforts will be dependent upon its ability to muster sufficient popular support to bring real pressure to bear on individual governments.